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ADDRESSING THE CURRENT CRISIS IN 
NCAA INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: 
WHERE IS CONGRESS? 




American intercollegiate athletics are in a state of crisis today.1  Our  
time-honored and revered traditions of placing academics, amateurism, and fair 
play ahead of commercialism and professionalism are under siege.2  As  
intercollegiate athletics programs, especially football and basketball, generate 
billions of dollars in annual revenues for their academic institutions and the 
                                                          
* The Authors are, respectively, Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, The  
University of South Dakota School of Law, and Member of the Advisory Board, American Antitrust 
Institute; Director of Compliance, The University of South Dakota Department of Athletics; and  
Lecturer, The University of South Dakota Beacom School of Business.  The Authors wish to thank 
Anthony Sutton and Teresa Carlisle for their assiduous efforts and assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Edward H. Grimmett, Comment, NCAA Amateurism and Athletics: A Perfect Marriage 
or a Dysfunctional Relationship? –An Antitrust Approach to Student-Athlete Compensation, 30 TOURO 
L. REV. 823, 859 (2014) (“Instead of acting in the student-athletes’ best interests, [NCAA] member 
institutions have clearly become motivated by economic concerns.”); William E. Kirwan & R. Gerald 
Turner, Changing the Game: Athletics Spending in an Academic Context, TRUSTEESHIP MAG. 
(Sept./Oct. 2010), http://agb.org/trusteeship/2010/septemberoctober/changing-the-game-athletics-
spending-in-an-academic-context (arguing that “rising expenses—and the pursuit of more revenue to 
support college sports—have become a destabilizing force for many institutions, regardless of athletic 
mission or program size”); Brian C. Mitchell, Show Me the Money: The Growing Financial Crisis in 
College Athletics, ACADEME BLOG (June 1, 2015), https://academeblog.org/2015/06/01/show-me-the-
money-the-growing-financial-crisis-in-college-athletics/ (questioning whether “most college athletic 
programs – as currently constituted – continue to make financial sense”); Bob Wuornos, When  
High-Profile Stars Get Paid, Will Real Amateurs Suffer?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/411740/future-other-college-sports-bob-wuornos (discussing 
ongoing debates “that could shake the very foundations of Division I (D1) sports” and questioning 
whether “the looming professionalization of revenue-generating” sports can be stopped “from  
decimating the non-revenue-generating sports, and indeed the very spirit of amateur athletics”). 
2. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting the 
Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 230–32 (2014) (discussing the long history of 
antitrust suits against the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the “increasing[] receptiv[ity 
of courts] to the idea that NCAA football and basketball players may be sufficiently involved in  
commercial activity to warrant closer inspection of their antitrust claims”).  
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entertainment industry,3 the idea that student-athletes should not share more 
equally in the economic bonanza is being attacked through a cacophony of  
antitrust and employment law cases.4  These cases require the courts to balance 
a complex web of competing and often conflicting social, moral, and economic 
values, norms, and objectives.5 
This Article reviews the historic developments and legal trends that have 
led to the current crisis facing intercollegiate athletics.  Based on our analysis, 
we argue that a continuing fusillade of antitrust challenges is not the best way 
to balance the diverse values and objectives at stake.6  Instead, it is time for a 
national dialogue, abetted by congressional studies and legislative action, that 
leads to a more rational and sensitive balancing of the social, moral, and  
economic values and objectives engendered by intercollegiate athletics.  
In Part II, we discuss the genesis of the current crisis and review the  
precarious balance of conflicting and competing interests facing the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member educational  
institutions. 
In Part III, we review the historic series of antitrust and employment law 
cases involving the NCAA and student-athletes.  We note that the courts’  
efforts to balance the competing commercial and non-commercial values and 
objectives at stake have produced a hodge-podge of confusing and often  
conflicting decisions.  We additionally discuss the current cutting-edge  
antitrust and employment law cases being pursued by student-athletes against 
the NCAA and its member institutions. 
                                                          
3. See, e.g., Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: 
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 74 n.11 (2006) (“College sports is a  
multi-billion-dollar industry.”). 
4. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 476–77 (2015) (footnote omitted) (citing Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL Free 
Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 1991 DUKE L.J. 503, 506–08 (1991); Joseph P. Bauer, 
Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace?, 60 
TENN. L. REV. 263 (1993); Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans,  
Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519 (1997)) (“Courts have played a crucial role 
in regulating change in professional sports, and now students are asking courts to play a similar role 
in college athletics.”).  
5. See, e.g., HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 128–29 (1929)  
(discussing “[t]he moral qualities that participation in college athletics is widely supposed to  
engender,” and “[t]he impairment of moral stamina” resulting from commercialization and  
dishonesty); Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249, 
257 (2014) (“Recognition of amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive benefit asks courts to balance 
the anticompetitive economic effects of restrictions on student-athletes with the social benefits of  
amateurism to college sports.”). 
6. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 257–58 (arguing that the antitrust laws are “not equipped or 
designed to balance social welfare with economic effects”). 
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In Part IV, we address the need for a national dialogue that will lead to a 
democratic legislative balancing of the conflicting and competing social, moral, 
and economic values and interests implicated by intercollegiate athletics.  We 
conclude that future expeditious democratic congressional review and  
oversight is preferable to the current spate of discordant legal decisions being 
generated through balkanized judicial intervention. 
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN NCAA INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
Intercollegiate athletics today are in a state of crisis.  Intercollegiate  
athletics’ growing crisis results from the need to balance a precarious mixture 
of deeply conflicting and clashing fundamental social, moral, and economic 
values.  On one side are the core social and moral values of amateurism,  
academics, and fair sportsmanship.7  For example, the NCAA Bylaws state: 
“Member institutions’ athletics programs are designed to be an integral part of 
the educational program.  The student-athlete is considered an integral part of 
the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college 
athletics and professional sports.”8  The NCAA Bylaws are designed to  
promote and protect “a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”9 
On the other side are the economic values of commercialism, revenue  
generation, and entertainment.10  “[I]ntercollegiate athletics has become a  
dazzlingly commercial activity.”11  Intercollegiate sports today are a huge  
                                                          
7. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121, 134–135 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); 
Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004) (quoting 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 
art 2.9 (2003)) (“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation 
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be  
derived.  Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should 
be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”).  In Board of Regents, 
Justice White observed that “[t]he NCAA’s member institutions have designed their competitive  
athletic programs ‘to be a vital part of the educational system.’”  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 121 
(White, J., dissenting) (citing 1982-83 NCAA MANUAL art II, § 2(a) (1982)).  
8. 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art 12.01.2 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]; see also  
Grimmett, supra note 1, at 828 (“The NCAA established itself as a non-profit organization with  
amateurism acting as the foundation.”). 
9. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.  Justice Stevens went on to note “that the preservation of the  
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”  Id. 
10. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, Essay, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic  
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 21 (2000) 
(“Over the past 150 years, the desire to win at virtually any cost, combined with the increases in public 
interest in intercollegiate athletics, in a consumer sense, have led inexorably to a highly  
commercialized world of intercollegiate athletics.”). 
11. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 155; see also Matthew J. Mitten & Stephen F. 
Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability 
of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 841 (2014) (“[T]he commercialization of college 
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entertainment business through which “[a]n enormous cast of participants  
harvests a wealth of riches.”12  “Commentators have long derided the stubborn 
‘myth of amateurism,’ noting that the NCAA has morphed into a profit-seeking 
machine that serves the decidedly professional and economic function of  
regulating college sports.”13  Indeed, “it would be fanciful to suggest that  
colleges are not concerned about the profitability of their ventures . . . [even 
though] other, non-commercial goals play a central role in their sports  
programs.”14  Former NCAA Executive Director (from 1951 to 1988) Walter 
Byers went so far as to attack the NCAA’s regulation of intercollegiate sports 
as “a nationwide money-laundering scheme.”15 
However one feels about such allegations and characterizations, it cannot 
be denied that intercollegiate sports today are a multi-billion dollar  
                                                          
sports directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society.”). 
12. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the 
NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496 (2008).  The authors observe, 
 
Universities derive enormous revenues and other indirect, but vital, benefits from  
successful athletic programs.  Corporations that sponsor athletic contests gain  
valuable exposure for their products and services.  The NCAA supports itself entirely 
by revenues generated from selling broadcasting rights of its members’ games.  
Many coaches are compensated lavishly for producing successful programs.  Media 
enterprises generate rich advertising revenues by airing college athletic events. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 75–76); see also  
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 75–76, 131 (“A broad array of participants in college 
sports harvests a wealth of riches,” and, “College sports is a fabulously profitable commercial  
enterprise as well as a lucrative component of the sports-entertainment industry.  Athletes generate 
great wealth for their university-employers through their skill and effort.”).  
13. Feldman, supra note 5, at 250 (footnote omitted) (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note 
12, at 496; Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/) (“[Commentator] criticism 
has only amplified over the last decade with the birth of billion dollar television deals, expanding 
tournament fields, and, of course, conference realignment.”). 
14. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 121 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, 
THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.12 (1979)); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“[Intercollegiate sports activities] are all part of the competitive market to attract student-athletes 
whose athletic labor can result in many benefits for a college, including economic gain.”); Justin M. 
Hannan, Case Comment, Antitrust Law–Seventh Circuit Sees Through Façade, Exposes NCAA  
Scholarship Limits to Sherman Antitrust Scrutiny—Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012), 
18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 345, 350–57 (2013) (arguing that NCAA student-athletes are 
engaged in commercial activities). 
15. WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 73 (1995).  Former NYU Chancellor L. Jay Oliva similarly stated in 1986, “The 
university that allows itself to feed off its sports program financially becomes dependent on the  
feeding—even addicted, if you will.”  L. Jay Oliva, A Challenge to Coaches: Special Opportunities 
Must Not Be Wasted, SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 1, 1986, at 32. 
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entertainment business.  The NCAA’s own revenues during the 2014 fiscal year 
totaled nearly $1 billion and included a surplus of nearly $80.5 million.16   
According to Forbes, “[t]he NCAA annually produces nearly $11 [b]illion in 
revenue from the operation of college sports – more than the estimated league 
totals for either the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey 
League.”17  College football revenue alone in 2013 topped $3.4 billion,  
according to data released by the Department of Education.18  Quite simply, 
there can be little doubt that intercollegiate sports have become a “multi-billion 
dollar entertainment product[].”19 
The NCAA is the organization tasked with overseeing and regulating  
intercollegiate sports’ precarious balance of social, moral, and economic  
values.  
  
Formed in 1905 in response to a public outcry concerning 
abuses in intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA, through its  
annual convention, establishes policies and rules governing its 
members’ participation in college sports, conducts national 
championships, exerts control over some of the economic  
aspects of revenue-producing sports, and engages in some 
more-or-less commercial activities.20 
                                                          
16. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-2014-
1-billion-revenue/70161386/. 
17. Marc Edelman, How NCAA Greed Has Led to a Student-Athlete Uprising, FORBES (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/02/11/how-ncaa-greed-has-led-to-a-student-
athlete-uprising/#2010756b4f01.  In 2013, “the University of Alabama [alone] reported $143.3 million 
in athletic revenues — more than the revenues of each of 30 NHL teams, and 25 of the 30 NBA teams.”  
Id.; see also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 823 (footnotes omitted) (citing Pete Thamel, With Big Paydays 
at Stake, College Teams Scramble for a Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/09/20/sports/ncaafootball/in-conference-realignment-colleges-run-to-payday-
light.html?_r=0; Michael Smith, Collegiate Licensing Explodes in CLC’s 30 Years, SPORTSBUSINESS 
J. (June 13, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/06/13/Colleges/CLC-at-
30.aspx) (“The NCAA and its member institutions generate billions of dollars through television  
revenue. Additionally, the NCAA and its licensing affiliate, The College Licensing Company (‘CLC’), 
procure large profits through the licensing of the names and images of student-athletes.”).  
18. Cork Gaines, College Football Reaches Record $3.4 Billion in Revenue, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 
17, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/college-football-revenue-2014-12. 
19. Feldman, supra note 5, at 255 (citing McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 505–20) 
(arguing “that the NCAA has become a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar  
entertainment products”); see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 496. 
20. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Note, Tackling 
Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656–57 (1978)).  For an excellent 
historical review of the factors leading to the founding of the NCAA, see Smith, supra note 10, at 10–
13.  See also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 827 (“The NCAA is a non-profit entity that acts as a regulator 
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Today, “[t]he NCAA has grown to include some 1,100 member schools,  
organized into three divisions:  Division I, Division II, and Division III.”21 
Unfortunately, commercialization and the attendant problems of colleges 
seeking to gain unfair competitive advantages are deeply rooted in the history 
of intercollegiate athletics.22  For example, by the late Nineteenth Century,  
Harvard’s President, Charles Eliot, became so concerned about the impact of 
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics that he “charg[ed] that ‘lofty gate 
receipts from college athletics had turned amateur contests into major  
commercial spectacles.’”23  “Rising concerns regarding the need to control the 
excesses of intercollegiate athletics” led President Theodore Roosevelt to 
“call[] for a White House conference to review [intercollegiate] football 
rules.”24  A “combined effort on the part of educators and the White House 
eventually led to a concerted effort to reform intercollegiate football rules,” 
which in turn led to the formation of the NCAA in 1905 (originally known as 
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association).25 
Since the NCAA’s inception in 1905, member schools have been forced to 
“wrestle[] with the same issues that we face today: the extreme pressure to win, 
which is compounded by the commercialization of sport, and the need for  
regulations and a regulatory body to ensure fairness and safety.”26  As the  
                                                          
of amateur athletics and works closely with its member universities to promote excellence in athletics 
as well as academics.”). 
21. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).  The Ninth Circuit additionally 
noted that “Division I schools are those with the largest athletic programs—schools must sponsor at 
least fourteen varsity sports teams to qualify for Division I—and they provide the most financial aid 
to student athletes.  Division I has about 350 members.”  Id. 
22. For example, the famous Harvard–Yale rowing regatta, which dates back to 1852, was plagued 
in its earliest years by Harvard trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage through the use of an 
athlete not enrolled as a student at Harvard.  See Smith, supra note 10, at 10–11; see also Rodney K. 
Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators Punish  
Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J.  985, 1057 (1987) (discussing the 1985 efforts “of the Presidents 
Commission and the NCAA to restore academic integrity to intercollegiate athletic programs”). 
23. Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with the Reform of Big-Time 
 Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV.  567, 570 (1991) (quoting John S. Watterson, Inventing 
Modern Football, AM. HERITAGE, Sept.–Oct. 1988, at 105).  Smith further notes, “The  
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, including the payment of compensation to the best  
athletes, was well entrenched by the latter part of the nineteenth century.”  Smith, supra note 22, at 
989. 
24. Smith, supra note 10, at 12 (footnote omitted) (citing GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS 
LAW 1 (1986); Smith, supra note 22, at 990).   
25. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Smith, supra note 22, at 991; SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 24, 
at 2). 
26. Id. (citing Smith, supra note 23, at 571).  Smith adds that “the commercialization and propensity 
to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the beginning of organized intercollegiate athletics in 
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popularity of intercollegiate athletics in the United States has grown, the NCAA 
has found itself trying to successfully balance a series of complex and  
conflicting social, moral, and economic goals and objectives.  For example, in 
1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education issued a  
report noting the need to better control the increasing commercialization of  
intercollegiate sports through “[a] change of values.”27  The Carnegie Report 
called for college presidents to reclaim the integrity and social morality of  
college athletics by minimizing their growing commercial and professional  
nature.28 
Today, nearly nine decades after the Carnegie Report called for a  
fundamental change in intercollegiate sports’ values, the NCAA finds itself 
again enmeshed in the vortex of a complex clash of values centered around the 
issue of fairly compensating student-athletes.  As the revenues from  
intercollegiate sports, especially football and basketball, have mushroomed, the 
calls from student-athletes to share more equally in the financial bonanza have 
risen exponentially.29  As noted by Arizona State University Professor Rodney 
                                                          
the United States.  The problem of cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the increasing  
commercialization of sport, was a matter of concern.”  Id. at 11; see also SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 
5, at 128–29 (“[O]ur study of the recruiting and subsidizing of college athletes affords much direct 
evidence that college athletics can breed, and, in fact, have bred, among athletes, coaches, directors, 
and even in some instances among college administrative officers, equivocation and dishonesty, which 
actual participation has not removed or prevented.”). 
27. Smith, supra note 10, at 13 (quoting Smith, supra note 22, at 991).  The Carnegie Foundation’s 
report stated, in part, 
 
a change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the commercial and the  
material and the vested interests that these forces have created.  Commercialism in 
college athletics must be diminished and college sports must rise to a point where it 
is esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords to mature 
youth . . . to exercise at once the body and the mind and to foster habits [of] both 
bodily health and . . . high qualities of character . . . . 
 
Smith, supra note 22, at 991 (alterations in original) (quoting GEORGE MASON UNIV. & THE AM. 
COUNCIL ON EDUC., ADMINISTRATION OF UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS: INTERNAL CONTROL AND 
EXCELLENCE 22 (1986)). 
28. See Smith, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
29. See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 74. 
 
By creating and fostering the myth that football and men’s basketball players at  
Division I universities are something other than employees, the NCAA and its  
member institutions obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the 
athletes’ talents, time, and energy–that is, their labor–while severely curtailing the 
costs associated with such labor.  
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K. Smith, “As the role of television and the revenue it brings to intercollegiate 
athletics has grown in magnitude, the desire for an increasing share of those 
dollars has become intense.”30 
Student-athletes’ growing economic demands are butting up against many 
university faculty and educators’ fears that a swelling tide of intercollegiate 
athletic commercialization may be threatening educational institutions’  
academic values.31  In response to such concerns, the NCAA has sought to  
introduce and implement processes and procedures designed “to enhance  
academic integrity and revitalize the role of faculty and students in overseeing 
intercollegiate athletics.”32  For example, the NCAA introduced a certification 
process designed to ensure that prospective student-athletes meet minimum  
academic standards to compete.33 
Another fast-growing set of fundamental social values the NCAA must  
balance against its members’ economic interests arises from “Title IX, with its 
call for gender equity in intercollegiate athletics.”34  Because women’s sports 
programs generally do not produce enough revenue to cover their costs, an  
“increase in net expenses has placed significant [economic] pressure on  
intercollegiate athletic programs.”35  Such economic and financial pressures 
                                                          
Id.  See also Grimmett, supra note 1, at 860 (arguing that “[t]he NCAA and its member institutions 
should reward athletes for their accomplishments while maintaining its foundational principles”); 
Sherman J. Clark, Response, College Sports and the Antitrust Analysis of Mystique, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. ONLINE 215, 229 (2015) (arguing that allowing student-athletes to sign endorsement deals 
“would solve some of the fairness and exploitation problems”). 
30. Smith, supra note 10, at 19. 
31. See id. at 16–17. 
32. Id. at 21 (citing Smith, supra note 22, at 1058). 
33. Id.  Under this certification process, NCAA schools must conduct in-depth self-studies covering 
such areas as “Governance and Rules Compliance, Academic Integrity, Fiscal Integrity, and a  
Commitment to Equity.  This process helps institutions focus on academic values and related issues.”  
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Smith, supra note 23, at 573–74, 576). 
    An example of an academic report that must be conducted by member institutions is the  
Academic Progress Rate (APR).  An APR report is a calculation of an institution’s success in retention, 
eligibility, and graduation of student-athletes for their individual sports.  If institutions fail to submit 
an APR report, the individual athletes and team are precluded from competing in any postseason  
competition.  In addition, schools that do not reach the minimum APR, as set forth by the NCAA, are 
also excluded from postseason competition.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, art 14.02.1.  The 
profound implications of such rules are shown by the punishments administered to the University of 
Connecticut 2012 national champion men’s basketball team.  The returning NCAA national champions 
for the 2011–2012 basketball season did not meet the minimum APR score and were ineligible for 
postseason competition for the 2012–2013 basketball season.  See Andy Katz, UConn Loses Final 
Appeal, CSNBBS, http://cincinnati.csnbbs.com/thread-564615-post-7769517.html#pid7769517 (last 
updated Apr. 6, 2012). 
34. Smith, supra note 10, at 19–20 (citing Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In 
Search of Racial and Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REV. 329, 367 (1996)). 
35. Id. at 20.  In all fairness, it should be noted that most men’s NCAA sports do not generate 
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have led many schools to seek to increase their revenue from such popular 
sports as football, basketball, and increasingly, baseball.  Further exacerbating 
such economic worries are concerns that “most of the revenue producing male 
sports are made up predominately of male student-athletes of color.”36  This 
raises additional social issues of racial fairness and equity that must be balanced 
by the NCAA in setting and implementing its regulatory policies.37 
Against this complex backdrop of competing and conflicting values and 
issues, the NCAA has sought to protect the long-revered traditions of  
amateurism, fairness, and sportsmanship in intercollegiate sports.38   
Attempting to maintain NCAA student-athletes’ amateurism, NCAA Bylaw 
12.1.2 requires that NCAA student-athletes must initially qualify as amateurs 
and then maintain their qualifications throughout the course of their  
intercollegiate careers.39  The NCAA’s Bylaws are at the center of the current 
                                                          
enough revenues to cover their costs. See Glenn M. Wong et al., NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: 
An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 11 (2015) (noting “that FCS and non-football Division I [athletic] programs are not 
intended to be, and likely cannot be, self-sustaining. . . . Instead, FCS and Division I schools without 
football rely heavily on allocated revenues from the university and other sources to operate the athletic 
department”). 
36. Smith, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Smith, supra note 34, at 367). 
37. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or 
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 370 (2007).  Lazaroff observes that 
 
if Congress chose to provide relief only for revenue-generating sports like major 
men’s football and basketball (and perhaps women’s basketball), clear conflict with 
Title IX would arise.  Congress would have to consider and balance the political, 
social, and economic costs and benefits of creating any limited exceptions to Title 
IX’s rigorous requirements. 
 
Id. 
38. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 134–35 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). 
39. NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 states (with certain express exceptions for men’s ice hockey and skiing) 
 
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate  
competition in a particular sport if the individual:  
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in 
that sport;  
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following  
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;  
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics,  
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as  
permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; . . . 
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any 
other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based 
on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and  
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intense debate between legal scholars, academics, business professionals, and 
intercollegiate sports fans as to whether NCAA student-athletes playing sports 
that generate substantial revenues, such as football and basketball, should  
receive compensation and remuneration above and beyond their athletic  
scholarships.40  At its heart, the current debate presents profound and complex 
conflicts of interests and values that are not easily balanced.  For example, how 
can the NCAA protect the revered tradition of amateur student intercollegiate 
athletics while maximizing the economic revenues of its member institutions?  
How can the NCAA emphasize its institutions’ academic goals when the  
revenues from sports are needed by the institutions to further those academic 
goals?  How does promoting a multi-billion dollar entertainment business  
comport with such goals as equity, fairness, and opportunity in student  
athletics? 
It would seem that balancing such complex and competing values would 
be a job, at least in the first instance, for democratically elected legislatures 
working with experts, rather than the courts.41  Unfortunately, Congress  
essentially has sat by and refused to intervene or act, leaving such issues to be 
addressed on an ad hoc and balkanized basis by the NCAA and its member 
institutions and, increasingly, to the courts in ongoing antitrust and labor and 
employment law cases.  As discussed below, inconsistent and intellectually  
dishonest rule of reason decisions by the courts have created “wildly diverse 
and incoherent application of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s student-athlete 
restrictions.”42  The result is uncertain and inconsistent rules that do not reflect 
                                                          
regulations;  
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.8, even if no 
pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw 
12.2.3.2.1; . . . 
(f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional  
draft . . . ; or  
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent. . . . 
 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, art 12.1.2. 
40. See, e.g., Darren Heitner, National Letter of Indenture: Why College Athletes Are Similar to 
Indentured Servants of Colonial Times, FORBES (July 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darren-
heitner/2012/07/25/national-letter-of-indenture-why-college-athletes-are-similar-to-indentured-serv-
ants-of-colonial-times/; Mark Emmert, Paying College Athletes Is a Terrible Idea, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204257504577151212467142838. 
41. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon:  The Need 
for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN. ST. 
L. REV. PENN STATIM 43, 52–54 (2015) (calling for better economic conjoint analyses in determining 
compensation limits for intercollegiate athletes). 
42. Feldman, supra note 5, at 258. 
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a careful or meaningful balancing of the social, moral, and economic values 
and issues facing the NCAA and its member institutions. 
III. THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST AND EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION  
INVOLVING THE NCAA 
The history of antitrust and employment litigation seeking to balance the 
NCAA and its member institutions’ conflicting social, moral, and economic 
values can be traced to the 1950s, when the NCAA first began seeking to  
exercise strong controls over its member institutions and their  
student-athletes.43  As “the NCAA’s enforcement capacity increased annually” 
in the 1950s and 1960s,44 the NCAA began to find itself in legal disputes and 
litigation, seeking to define the limits of its power and authority over its  
member institutions and their student-athletes. 
 A.    Relevant NCAA Antitrust and Employment Law Cases 
 1.    University of Denver v. Nemeth45 
One of the earliest cases addressing the issue of the status and rights of 
student-athletes occurred in 1953, after a University of Denver student-athlete 
was accidentally injured during a football practice held on the university’s 
property.46  The student, Ernest Nemeth, who worked part-time and played 
football for the university in exchange for housing and additional  
compensation, sought workmen’s compensation arguing that he was an  
employee of the university.47  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
agreed with Mr. Nemeth’s position that he was an employee of the University 
of Denver and ruled that the university was obligated to provide compensation 
to him for his football injuries.48 
                                                          
43. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 10, at 15 (“Thus, in 1951, the NCAA began to exercise more  
earnestly the authority which it had been given by its members.”). 
44. Id. at 15. 
45. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953). 
46. Id. at 424. 
47. Id. at 424–25. 
48. Id. at 425–30.  The Colorado Supreme Court explained,  
 
Higher education in this day is a business, and a big one. . . . A student employed by 
the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his education program, is no 
different than the employee who is taking no course of instruction so far as the  
Workmen’s Compensation Act is concerned. 
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The Nemeth decision set off a firestorm of alarms within the NCAA and its 
member institutions, which catalyzed them to coin the term “student-athlete” 
hoping to emphasize athletes’ status as students, rather than as commercial  
employees, and potentially professional athletes.49  The NCAA’s  
then-Executive Director Walter Byers explained that the term student-athlete 
was crafted to stanch any ideas that NCAA athletes could be considered  
professional athletes or employees.50 
 2.    NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma51 
As televised sports increased in popularity during the 1980s and huge 
amounts of money began to pour into the NCAA, the NCAA found its status 
as the neutral and non-commercial protector of a revered tradition of amateur 
intercollegiate sports open to attack.  The seminal 1984 antitrust case of Board 
of Regents involved an attack under section 1 of the Sherman Act52 against the 
strict limits imposed by the NCAA on the number of football games that could 
be televised by its member schools.53  From the outset, the Court wrestled with 
the question of how best to characterize the NCAA’s program of  
self-regulation.54  Justice White and Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that 
“the essentially noneconomic nature of the NCAA’s program of  
self-regulation”55 and “[t]he legitimate noneconomic goals of colleges and  
universities” should exempt the NCAA’s regulations from the Sherman Act.56  
Justice White lauded the schools’ and NCAA’s “noneconomic values like the 
promotion of amateurism and fundamental education objectives,”57 and noted 
that the NCAA’s “plan foster[ed] the goal of amateurism by spreading revenues 
among various schools and reducing the financial incentives toward  
                                                          
Id. at 425–26. 
49. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 83–84 (“The NCAA adopted and mandated 
the term ‘student-athlete’ purposely to buttress the notion that such individuals should be considered 
students rather than employees.”). 
50. See BYERS, supra note 15, at 69–70.  Mr. Byers explained, “That threat was the dreaded notion 
that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees . . . . We [therefore] crafted the term  
student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated  
substitute for such words as players and athletes.”  Id. at 69. 
51. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). 
53. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88, 94.  
54. See generally id. 
55. Id. at 133 (White, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 134. 
57. Id. 
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professionalism.”58 
Unlike the dissenting Justices, the majority started with the premise that 
the NCAA’s challenged practices constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.59  Nevertheless, the Court’s majority  
decided to analyze the restraints under the rule of reason, as opposed to a per 
se analysis, because the case “involve[d] an industry in which horizontal  
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”60  
On the one hand, the Court praised the NCAA “as the guardian of an important 
American tradition”61 and noted that “the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling 
college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be 
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.”62  On the other hand, the 
Court found “that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member  
institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA ha[d] restricted  
rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”63  
The Court, therefore, ruled that the NCAA’s restraints violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.64 
Although the Court ruled that the NCAA and its member institutions were 
not exempt from the antitrust laws, it ultimately provided no clear guidance as 
                                                          
58. Id. at 135.  Justice White further urged “that associations of nonprofit educational institutions 
[should not have to] defend their self-regulatory restraints solely in terms of their competitive impact, 
without regard for the legitimate noneconomic values they promote.”  Id.  It is interesting to note that 
Justice White previously was an All-American halfback for the University of Colorado football team, 
as well as a member of its baseball and basketball teams.  He ultimately went on to play in the NFL 
and led the league in rushing in both 1938 and 1940.  At one point, he was the NFL’s highest paid 
player, earning over $15,000 per year. 
59. See id. at 98–100 (majority opinion). 
60. Id. at 101. 
61. Id. at 101 n.23. 
62. Id. at 102.  The Court’s majority added, 
 
Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college  
football.  The identification of this “product” with an academic tradition  
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional 
sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league 
baseball.  In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” athletes 
must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.  And the integrity of 
the “product” cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution 
adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing 
field might soon be destroyed. 
 
Id. at 101–02. 
63. Id. at 120. 
64. Id. 
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how best to characterize and balance the NCAA’s conflicting missions and 
competing values.  The Court left open the long-term issue of how to promote 
educational institutions’ revenue-enhancing commercial needs without  
overshadowing their social and moral educational missions.65  Unfortunately, 
subsequent antitrust and employment law cases involving the NCAA and the 
rights of its member institutions and their student-athletes have done little to 
resolve this value-laden dilemma or to clear up the ongoing and increasing  
confusion surrounding student-athletes’ eligibility and compensation. 
 3. McCormack v. NCAA66 
Since NCAA v. Board of Regents, the courts generally have tried to balance 
the conflicting values and objectives of the NCAA and its member institutions 
by seeking to characterize NCAA rules, regulations, and enforcement activities 
as either commercial or non-commercial in nature.67  For example, just four 
years after the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s college football  
television restrictions, the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of an antitrust  
complaint filed by Southern Methodist University (SMU) football players, 
cheerleaders, and alumni “contending that the NCAA violated the antitrust and 
civil rights laws by promulgating and enforcing rules restricting the benefits 
that may be awarded student athletes.”68  As background, by the mid-1980s, 
SMU built its football program from a perennial doormat into a national power.  
Following up on reported misconduct, the NCAA began investigating the SMU 
program.  “The NCAA found that [SMU] had violated its rules[, which] 
limit[ed the amount of] compensation [available] . . . to scholarships with  
limited financial benefits.”69  Further, it was determined that SMU officials 
learned about the payments in the 1980s.70 Due to these findings, the NCAA 
cancelled SMU’s 1987 football season.71  Additionally, the NCAA also  
imposed harsh penalties on future seasons.72 
                                                          
65. See id. at 102.  Justice White cogently noted that each of the NCAA’s “regulations represents 
a desirable and legitimate attempt ‘to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the 
extent that profit making objectives would overshadow educational objectives.’”  Id. at 123 (White, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Kupec v. Atl. Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (M.D.N.C. 1975)). 
66. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
67. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 17–28 (2014). 
68. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340. 
69. Id.  
70. Id.  
71. Id. 
72. Id.  The cancellation of the 1987 season and the additional penalties placed on the program has 
now come to be known as the “death penalty.”  SMU was the first and only team to receive the death 
penalty. 
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Pointing to Board of Regents, the Fifth Circuit ruled “that the NCAA’s  
eligibility rules [were] reasonable and that the plaintiffs [had] failed to allege 
any facts to the contrary.”73  Although the Fifth Circuit sought to dodge the 
commercial versus non-commercial debate, it ultimately ruled that the NCAA’s 
rules were a reasonable response “in the face of commercializing pressures.”74 
 4. Subsequent Antitrust Cases 
Since the 1980s, the courts have continued to struggle with questions about 
how best to characterize the NCAA’s rules, regulations, and enforcement  
activities.  In a number of instances, the courts have upheld the NCAA’s rules 
as non-commercial restraints.  For example, in Smith v. NCAA,75 the Third  
Circuit rebuffed a prospective athlete’s challenge to an NCAA Bylaw  
prohibiting graduate students from participating in NCAA sports at an  
institution other than his or her undergraduate alma mater.76  Upholding the 
dismissal of plaintiff Renee Smith’s antitrust claim under section 1 of the  
Sherman Act, the Third Circuit ruled that the NCAA’s Bylaw was not a  
commercial restraint.77 
Following Smith, a United States district court in New Jersey upheld the 
NCAA Clearinghouse process used to determine incoming freshmen’s  
eligibility to participate in NCAA intercollegiate athletics.78  The court ruled 
that the NCAA’s eligibility rules were not truly commercial in nature.79   
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit characterized various NCAA recruiting rules as 
“noncommercial restraints” beyond the reach of the Sherman Act in rejecting 
a fired University of Kentucky recruiting coordinator and assistant football 
                                                          
73. Id. at 1343.  The court noted the NCAA’s arguments that its “eligibility rules ha[d] purely or 
primarily noncommercial objectives” and found “some support in the caselaw” for that argument.  Id.  
The court stated, however, that it need not address the argument because “the NCAA markets college 
football as a product distinct from professional football.  The eligibility rules create the product and 
allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures.  The goal of the NCAA is to integrate 
athletics with academics.  Its requirements reasonably further this goal.”  Id. at 1344–45 (citing NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
802, 817–18 (1981); Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, supra note 20, at 676). 
74. Id. at 1345 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102; Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, supra note 
73; Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, supra note 20, at 676). 
75. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
76. Id. at 187. 
77. Id.  The Third Circuit ruled that the Bylaw protected “undergraduates from foregoing  
participation in athletic programs . . . to preserve eligibility on a postbaccalaureate basis at another 
institution.”  Id. 
78. Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–66 (D.N.J. 1998). 
79. Id. at 497. 
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coach’s conspiracy claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act.80  Other courts 
followed similar reasoning in rejecting antitrust claims against the NCAA.81 
Other courts, however, have found various NCAA activities to be  
commercial in nature.  For example, just four years before its ruling in Bassett, 
the Sixth Circuit ruled that an NCAA restraint limiting the number of  
pre-season tournaments NCAA college basketball teams could participate in 
was commercial in nature.82   
Similarly, in 2012, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “the transactions between 
NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, 
and therefore take place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman 
Act.”83  It is important to note, however, that the Seventh Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the district court’s holding on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to 
allege sufficient facts to support the potential finding of a legally cognizable 
relevant antitrust market.84 
In determining whether NCAA student-athletes participate in a commercial 
market, a few courts have been receptive to such reasoning.  For example, a 
United States district court in Washington rejected a motion to dismiss an  
antitrust case in 2005, challenging the number of grant-in-aid football  
scholarships that NCAA schools could award.85  The court found that the 
                                                          
80. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2008). 
81. See, e.g., Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (upholding NCAA recruiting regulations as noncommercial in nature under the Sherman Act); 
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. SA CV 99-663-GLT(EEx), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18618, at *7 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 15, 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a Pac-10  
conference rule mandating that any student-athlete who transferred from one Pac-10 school to another 
would lose two years of eligibility, as a noncommercial restraint); Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. 
Supp. 2d 1275, 1280, 1286–87 (D. Kan. 1999) (rejecting the challenge of an NCAA rule limiting the 
size of manufacturers’ trademarks on NCAA schools’ equipment and uniforms as a noncommercial 
rule designed “to preserve the integrity of college athletics  and to avoid the commercial exploitation 
of student athletes”); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (upholding  
challenged rules as having the noncommercial purpose of “prevent[ing] commercializing influences 
from destroying the unique ‘product’ of NCAA college football”). 
82. Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004).  The 
Sixth Circuit ruled that the NCAA’s restriction “ha[d] some commercial impact insofar as it regulates 
games that constitute sources of revenue for both the member schools and the Promoters.”  Id.  
83. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing White v. NCAA, CV 06-999-RGK 
(MANx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006)).  The Seventh Circuit 
went on, however, to state that the Supreme Court’s Rule of Reason analysis in Board of Regents 
implied that most NCAA regulations would constitute “a ‘justifiable means of fostering competition 
among amateur athletic teams,’ and are therefore procompetitive.”  Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of  
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). 
84. Id. at 345. 
85. In re NCAA I–A Walk–On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 
2005). 
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NCAA’s limitation on the number of athletic scholarships an NCAA institution 
could offer in various sports might be related to commercial cost-cutting  
interests, rather than competitive balance concerns.86  A United States district 
court in California reached a similar ruling in a class action alleging that NCAA 
regulations capping the amount of financial aid a student-athlete could receive 
was an unlawful agreement in restraint of trade.87  Some commentators argue 
that the court’s ruling “could be read to imply that the competition between 
colleges and universities for student-athletes [is] sufficiently ‘commercial’  
conduct for antitrust review.”88 
 5. Non-Antitrust Challenges 
In addition to antitrust challenges, aggrieved plaintiffs have sought to  
pursue other avenues of redress against the NCAA.  For example, former  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian 
sued the NCAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights after the NCAA imposed various sanctions on UNLV’s  
basketball program, and requested that it show cause why additional penalties 
should be imposed if UNLV failed to suspend Tarkanian.89  Overruling the 
Nevada courts’ rulings in Coach Tarkanian’s favor, the Supreme Court found 
the NCAA’s actions to be private conduct and, therefore, not subject to a  
state-action challenge.90 
B. Recent Antitrust Cases Involving the Compensation and  
Remuneration of NCAA Student-Athletes 
The debate about whether student-athletes are effectively employees  
entitled to compensation and remuneration above and beyond their scholarship 
packages has dogged the NCAA for decades.91  Recently, high profile antitrust 
litigation has thrust the debate into an intense public spotlight.  In O’Bannon v. 
                                                          
86. Id. at 1146–47. 
87. White, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *4. 
88. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 67, at 25; see also Ray Yasser, The Case for 
Reviving the Four-Year Deal, 86 TUL. L. REV. 987, 988 (2012) (arguing that the NCAA’s rule  
mandating that athletic scholarships be offered on a one-year renewable basis may violate the Sherman 
Act by limiting competition for student-athletes through offers of longer guaranteed scholarships). 
89. See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
90. Id. at 191 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)). 
91. See discussion supra Section I; SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 225 (noting that in 1929,  
“notwithstanding many statements to the contrary, the colleges and universities of the United States 
are confronted with acute problems of recruiting and subsidizing, especially with respect to  
intercollegiate football”). 
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NCAA,92 the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part United 
States District Judge Claudia Wilken’s judgment in an antitrust bench trial  
challenging the NCAA’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from being paid for 
the use of their names, images, and likenesses.93  The district court held that 
the NCAA’s amateurism rules were an unlawful restraint of trade in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.94  The district court ordered that NCAA  
student-athletes were entitled to receive Name-Image-Likeness (NIL)  
payments of “up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation, to be held in  
trust . . . until after they le[ft] college.”95 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that the NCAA’s  
existing compensation rules violate section 1 of the Sherman Act “and its  
injunction requiring the NCAA to permit schools to provide compensation up 
to the full cost of attendance.”96  However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the 
district court clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative to allow students to 
receive NIL cash payments untethered to their education expenses.”97  The 
Ninth Circuit, therefore, “vacate[d] the district court’s judgment and permanent 
injunction insofar as they require[d] the NCAA to allow its member schools to 
pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation.”98   
Instead, the court ruled that “[t]he Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA  
permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their  
student-athletes.  It does not require more.”99 
The Ninth Circuit’s O’Bannon decision seems to raise more questions than 
it answers.  As with so many earlier court decisions involving the NCAA, the 
court struggled with how to balance and weigh the NCAA’s social and moral 
values of amateurism and academics against its clear economic and commercial 
values and objectives.  Ultimately, the court admitted that it could not draw the 
line as to where amateurism in athletics ends and professionalism begins.100  
                                                          
92. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
93. Id. at 1053.  By way of disclosure, Author Horton was a signatory to the Brief of Antitrust 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) (No. 09-cv-03329). 
94. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1075–76.  The court “reaffirm[ed] that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny 
and must be tested in the crucible of the Rule of Reason.”  Id. at 1079.  The court found that “the 
NCAA’s rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in 
support of the college sports market.”  Id. 
97. Id. at 1076. 
98. Id. at 1079. 
99. Id. 
100. See id. at 1079. 
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Consequently, it resorted to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Board of  
Regents that courts “must afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend  
college athletics.”101  With billions of dollars at stake, the Ninth Circuit’s  
decision is unlikely to deter future NIL and compensation antitrust lawsuits 
against the NCAA.102 
Meanwhile, a current class action before Judge Claudia Wilken, the same 
district judge who decided the O’Bannon case, “seeks a free market for college 
football and men’s basketball players to be paid.”103  The current Jenkins class 
action directly attacks the NCAA’s eligibility rules.104  The plaintiffs claim that 
the NCAA and its Power Conferences have created a cartel by placing a ceiling 
on the compensation that may be paid to men’s basketball and football  
players.105  They additionally allege that by disallowing member institutions to 
compete for the services of basketball and football players, the NCAA and the 
five Power Conferences violated antitrust laws.106  The plaintiffs believe that 
the NCAA’s “restrictions are pernicious, a blatant violation of the antitrust 
laws, have no legitimate pro-competitive justification, and should now be 
struck down and enjoined.”107 
Essentially, the Jenkins plaintiffs claim that under the Sherman Act,  
student-athletes should be afforded the opportunity to render their services to 
the highest bidder.  Practically and pragmatically speaking, a decision for  
plaintiffs would professionalize college athletics.  What would such a result 
mean for the revered tradition of academics and amateurism in intercollegiate 
sports? 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Jenkins claims and the Ninth  
Circuit’s O’Bannon decision, it seems clear that we will witness more and more 
                                                          
101. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)). 
102. See, e.g., Michael T. Jones, Real Accountability: The NCAA Can No Longer Evade Antitrust 
Liability Through Amateurism After O’Bannon v. NCAA, 56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 79, 90 
(2015) (arguing that “other courts should follow the example of O’Bannon’s analysis of the legal  
merits and economic implications of the NCAA’s amateurism policies, and continue to trend away 
from blind deference to the NCAA”). 
103. Benjamin A. Tulis & Gregg E. Clifton, Ninth Circuit Holds NCAA Subject to Antitrust  
Scrutiny, but Vacates Injunction Allowing up to $5,000 per Year Deferred Compensation to College 
Athletes, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-holds-
ncaa-subject-to-antitrust-scrutiny-vacates-injunction-allowing. 
104. See Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14CV01678, 2014 WL 1008526 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014). 
105. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.  The plaintiffs include one current student-athlete, Martin Jenkins, and three former  
student-athletes: Johnathan Moore, Kevin Perry, and William Tyndall.  Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 21.  The 
defendants include the NCAA, the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big 12 Conference, the Big Ten 
Conference, the Pac-12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference.  Id. ¶¶ 23–25. 
106. Id. ¶ 42. 
107. Id. ¶ 1. 
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antitrust litigation against the NCAA in coming years.  Is more antitrust  
litigation really the best way to balance the competing and conflicting values 
and objectives of NCAA educational institutions and their intercollegiate  
athletic programs, not to mention the rights of NCAA student-athletes? 
C. Potential Conclusions from Prior and Current Antitrust and Employment 
Cases Against the NCAA 
It is difficult to draw clear meaningful conclusions from the cacophony of 
balkanized judicial decisions involving the NCAA, much less predict how  
future cases will be decided.  A recent study of forty-six student-athlete legal 
challenges against the NCAA between 1973 and 2014 revealed a steady and 
even flow of cases over the past forty-one years.108  The heavy majority of the 
“cases involved men’s sports (89%), particularly football and basketball.”109  
“Overall, courts ruled 82 times, with the NCAA winning 60% of the rulings.  
Students completely won in 29% of decisions, and partly won in the remaining 
11% of decisions.”110  It seems safe to say that the courts generally have bent 
over backwards to afford the NCAA maximum freedom and discretion in 
promulgating and enforcing rules relating to its member institutions and their 
student-athletes’ conduct and rights.  It also seems safe to predict, despite the 
recent O’Bannon decision, that the courts will continue seeking in future cases 
to allow the NCAA to protect intercollegiate athletics’ revered history and  
tradition of amateurism, sportsmanship, and fair competition. 
We believe that the NCAA plays an invaluable role in protecting the social 
and moral values and objectives typified in intercollegiate athletics.  We  
additionally believe that the NCAA must be afforded wide discretion and  
latitude in working with its member educational institutions to promote and 
enhance such values and goals.  But we wonder whether the economics rhetoric 
of current American antitrust jurisprudence really allows for the most  
meaningful and socially beneficial discussion and balancing of the conflicting 
social, moral, and economic values and goals implicated by NCAA  
intercollegiate athletics.111 
                                                          
108. LeRoy, supra note 4, at 482. 
109. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
110. Id. at 483. 
111. See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS 
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 39–40 (2d ed. 2008); Mitten & Ross, supra note 11, at 876 
(“The current structure of self-interested internal governance by the NCAA’s member universities, 
combined with external micro-regulation by means of antitrust and contract law litigation on a  
case-by-case basis, is not the most effective way to achieve [the NCAA’s myriad of] objective[s].”).  
See generally Peter C. Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A 
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As an example, one of the foremost goals of intercollegiate athletics is  
competitive fairness.  Yet, “[s]teady and unremitting efforts since the 1970s by 
neoclassical economic theorists to excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon 
have been wildly successful.”112  Indeed, in a non-sports antitrust case, Seventh 
Circuit jurist and former academic Frank Easterbrook asked: “Who says that 
competition is supposed to be fair . . . ?”113  Furthermore, many esteemed  
antitrust scholars argue that antitrust should not be used to address social or 
moral issues.114 Given antitrust’s distaste for the moral implications of conduct, 
can we meaningfully and fairly balance the NCAA’s laudable social and moral 
goals by resorting to an antitrust system seemingly focused on maximizing  
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency?115 
                                                          
[Re]conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 
349 (2000).  For example, some authors observe, 
 
Although . . . courts sometimes have articulated non-economic goals for U.S.  
antitrust law, their reliance on such goals as a source of useful guidance for deciding 
particular cases has consistently waned since the early 1970s.  Non-economic goals 
frequently conflict with economic aims, provide too little guidance for antitrust  
decision makers, and arguably are ill-suited to decision-making processes that rely 
on adjudication and the adversary system. 
 
GAVIL ET AL., supra note 111.  Indeed, competition officials during the Bush administration urged that 
the “promotion of consumer welfare and the organization of free market economy are the only goals 
of [the] antitrust laws . . . with other economic and social objectives better pursued by other instru-
ments.”  UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE 
OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL 
MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 31 (May 2007), http://www.internationalcom-
petitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf. 
112. Thomas J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 823, 863 (2013); see also ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 145–46 (1989) (discussing efforts of “some jurists and scholars . . . 
to excise fairness from the antitrust lexicon”). 
113. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in 
part). 
114. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 10, 
54 (2005) (stating that antitrust is not concerned with the moral implications of conduct—only the 
economic implications); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 49, 105 (2007) (“It has been a long time since anyone has thought about antitrust in 
explicitly moral terms . . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) (“[A]ntitrust has no moral content . . . .”). 
115. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, 
judicial and academic, in the antitrust field”); see also Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in 
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete 
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2363 (2014) (citing 
Ken Belson, What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for Colleges and Players, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), 
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“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently rejected social welfare  
justifications in antitrust analys[e]s.”116  As a result, the courts too often  
resorted to the disingenuous and intellectually dishonest legal fiction that 
NCAA rules and regulations can be meaningfully evaluated based on whether 
they are primarily commercial or non-commercial in their purpose and effect.  
Consequently, complex intercollegiate athletics cases calling for a delicate  
balancing of social, moral, and economic values and objectives have instead 
been pigeon-holed into commercial and non-commercial analyses that pretend 
to be economically based but really involve social issues crying out for a  
democratic dialogue and legislative action. 
As seen above, the courts repeatedly employed the legal fiction that the 
NCAA’s rules or regulations are non-commercial to uphold NCAA decisions 
and actions.  Yet, the idea that any rule or regulation that the NCAA  
promulgates and enforces ultimately does not have some commercial impact 
on intercollegiate sports is simply absurd.  When rules and regulations  
impacting the generation and allocation of billions of dollars annually are at 
stake, economic and commercial values are implicated.  Pretending that the 
NCAA is not “a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar  
entertainment products”117 serves no rational or societally beneficial purposes.  
Refreshingly, the Seventh Circuit seemed to recognize as much in Agnew.118 
A continuing cacophony of conflicting intercollegiate athletics antitrust 
and employment law decisions is not the way to rationally and coherently  
balance the complex and conflicting economic and non-economic values,  
objectives, and goals surrounding NCAA sports.  What is really needed is a 
national discussion. 
The Supreme Court long has recognized that economic regulations seeking 
to implement the types of social and moral values and benefits that the NCAA 
espouses are “properly addressed to Congress.”119  With the future of amateur 
intercollegiate athletics at stake, it is time for the courts to step aside and  
Congress to step in. 
                                                          
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/what-the-obannon-ruling-means-for-colleges-and-play-
ers.html?_r=0) (criticizing the O’Bannon district court’s decision because “antitrust jurisprudence is 
not supposed to be about creating compromises donned in social policy.  It is supposed to protect 
consumers and free markets.”). 
116. Feldman, supra note 5, at 253–54. 
117. Id. at 254–55. 
118. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012). 
119. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978). 
HORTON ET AL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:34 PM 
2016]   THE CURRENT CRISIS IN NCAA ATHLETICS  385 
IV. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
It is beyond dispute that the United States has a long and revered history 
and tradition of encouraging and supporting intercollegiate athletics and the 
social and moral values they buttress.  Numerous tangible and intangible  
benefits are bestowed upon student-athletes thanks to the NCAA and its  
regulations.  Many major college football and college basketball  
student-athletes receive scholarships that cover their tuition, room, board, and 
textbooks.  Other benefits include stipends when traveling to pay for meals and 
entertainment, free admission for family and friends to sporting events,  
clothing and equipment, insurance and medical care, paid travel expenses,  
personalized training, personalized nutrition plans, and first rate coaching and 
instruction.  The funds that pay for these benefits come from the revenues  
generated by the NCAA, its members’ athletic conferences, and the individual 
educational institutions.    
Most importantly, student-athletes receive the benefit of a free college  
education.  Martin Luther King Jr. once said: “Intelligence plus character—that 
is the goal of true education.”120  While academics provide student-athletes and 
students alike with an education, athletics further build the characters of  
student-athletes while promoting such values as discipline, self-confidence,  
accountability, and teamwork.  It is, therefore, critical that we find ways to  
encourage and protect the social and moral values of intercollegiate activities. 
With so much at stake, we must ask: “Where is Congress?”  In her district 
court decision in O’Bannon, District Court Judge Wilken cogently observed, 
 
It is likely that the challenged restraints, as well as other  
perceived inequities in college athletics and higher education 
generally, could be better addressed as a policy matter by  
reforms other than those available as a remedy for the antitrust 
violation found here.  Such reforms and remedies could be  
undertaken by the NCAA, its member schools and  
conferences, or Congress.121 
 
Fortunately, several members of Congress have begun paying close  
attention to the current turmoil surrounding the NCAA and have begun  
considering possible legislative action.122 
                                                          
120. MARTIN LUTHER KING III, THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 27 (2d ed. 1987). 
121. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d, 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
122. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz, More Eyes in Congress Looking at NCAA, USA TODAY (May 
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A. Possible Antitrust Exemptions for the NCAA 
Following the brief NCAA regulation known as the Sanity Code, the 
NCAA regulations of the 1950s allowed institutions to entice student athletes 
with scholarships.123  In 1951, while talking about the scholarship model’s  
potential antitrust issues, NCAA attorney Philip R. Hochberg observed: “The 
NCAA . . . passed up the opportunity to apply for an [antitrust] exemption of 
its own, believing that it didn't need one because of its ties to higher  
education.”124  Mr. Hochberg probably wishes that the NCAA had pushed for 
an exemption, because the landscape of college athletics looks very different 
today than it did in the 1950s.  
In the current heightened state of commercialized intercollegiate athletics, 
some commentators call for a broad NCAA antitrust exemption.125  For  
example, Professor Brian Porto advocates for the College Sports Legal Reform 
Act, which would grant the NCAA a broad antitrust exemption “as long as at 
least one principal purpose of any such action is educational.”126  The proposed 
broad antitrust exemptions would give the NCAA the ability to make sweeping 
changes to intercollegiate athletics.  Len Elmore, who has a long history in both 
college and professional sports, similarly advocates for a broad NCAA antitrust 
exemption.127  Mr. Elmore contends: “The National Collegiate Athletic  
Association has the potential to be a central and powerful regulatory body that 
can offer real reform, but antitrust restrictions prevent it from regulating all 
aspects of intercollegiate sports.”128  As an example, Mr. Elmore argues that 
without the limits placed on it by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents, the 
NCAA would have the power to distribute revenue into a university’s general 
                                                          
20, 2014), Westlaw 2014 WLNR 13469908.  The article notes that congressmen such as Elijah  
Cummings (D. Md.) and Tony Cardenas (D. Cal.) have sought to put pressure on the NCAA on  
growing issues such as academic fraud and head injuries. Id. 
123. Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 333.  The Sanity Code restricted scholarships to the “normal  
channels” that all students had to pursue.  Id. (quoting ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 47 (1992)). Additionally, 
scholarships could not be based on athletic ability.  Id. (citing FLEISHER ET AL., supra).  
124. Welch Suggs, Football, Television, and the Supreme Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9, 
2004), http://chronicle.com/article/Football-Televisionthe/2342. 
125. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 2, at 238–46, 248 (discussing the calls for an antitrust  
exemption for the NCAA but concluding that “application of Sherman Act principles by the courts is 
a better alternative than blanket immunity”).   
126. See BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS 
COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 188 (4th ed. 2015). 
127. See Len Elmore, Exempt the NCAA from Antitrust, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Exempt-the-NCAA-From-Antitrust/130073/. 
128. Id. 
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funds and not directly back into athletic departments.129  
Fortunately, a broad antitrust exemption, and a consequentially all  
powerful central NCAA, is not the only option.130  For example, a narrow  
antitrust exemption might grant the NCAA the ability to make competitive  
reforms in certain areas subject to congressional oversight.  In an effort to  
control the costs associated with college sports, some scholars and educators 
advocate for a partial antitrust exemption focused on salaries and athletic  
budgets.131  Such an exemption could allow the NCAA to set caps on coaches 
and administrators’ compensation, as well as team expenses without granting 
it a blanket antitrust immunity.132 
B. Other Possible Congressional Regulation 
Rather than granting the NCAA more power, some believe that Congress 
needs to more heavily regulate intercollegiate athletics.133  For example,  
Representatives Charlie Dent (R. Pa.) and Joyce Beatty (D. Oh.) introduced the 
National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act on June 11, 2015.134   
Representatives Dent’s and Beatty’s bill seeks to amend the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 to include concussion testing, irrevocable four-year scholarships, 
                                                          
129. Id. 
130. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 2, at 247–48 (arguing that “granting a blanket antitrust e 
xemption to the NCAA, without the farmer watching the henhouse, would be the equivalent of leaving 
the fox free to devour its prey”); Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 370 (arguing that an antitrust exemption 
“would also perpetuate the inequities that run rampant in the current system and make legal  
significantly anticompetitive conduct”). 
131. See, e.g., Jake New, Presidential Panel on College Sports?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 13, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/13/ncaa-discuss-federal-oversight-college-
athletics-white-house. 
132. But see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).  When the NCAA sought to pass a 
salary cap in the 1990s, it was blocked by the Tenth Circuit.  Id. at 1012–13, 1024.  A limited antitrust 
exemption could rectify this ruling, which allows coaches to earn millions of dollars while their players 
are classified as amateurs. 
133. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 369 (observing, “If the NCAA cannot resolve the  
problems presented by its regulation of student-athletes internally, and if the courts do not adequately 
address the problem, perhaps Congress will be the last resort”); Mitten & Ross, supra note 11, at 877 
(discussing how “[a] federal regulatory commission [c]ould have the necessary authority to establish 
rules that [would] effectively prevent intercollegiate athletics from crossing the line between a  
commercial/education model and a commercial/professional model for intercollegiate sports, enhance 
the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics, [and] promote more competitive balance in  
intercollegiate sports competition.”); Christopher M. Parent, Forward Progress? An Analysis of 
Whether Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 226, 234–36 (2004) (discussing 
possible legislative approaches).  But see Lazaroff, supra note 37, at 369 (arguing, “The political  
cross-currents that so often accompany the legislative process suggest that the viability or desirability 
of this alternative might be criticized severely”). 
134. See National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act, H.R. 2731, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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a ban on institutional stipends to student-athletes, and formal hearings prior to 
any NCAA punishment.135 The proposed bill also calls for the establishment of 
a Presidential Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, which would be tasked 
to review, analyze, and report to the President and Congress.136  
Some congressional members sought to limit regulation to only the richest 
athletic departments.  For instance, on November 20, 2013, Representative 
Tony Cárdenas (D. Cal.) introduced the Collegiate Student Athlete Protection 
Act.137  This bill seeks to mandate student-athlete benefits, such as five-year 
athletic scholarships for those student-athletes in good academic standing,  
concussion testing, and the full coverage of costs associated with injury or  
illness.138 The catch to Congressman Cárdenas’s bill is that it would only apply 
to athletic departments generating $10 million or more in revenue.139   
Not surprisingly, both of these important pieces of potential legislation 
were stalled since they were referred to committee.  The last major action on 
the proposed Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act came on November 20, 
2013, when it was referred to the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce.140 The National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act has also 
been sitting in the House Committee on Education and the Workforce since 
June 11, 2015.141  Nevertheless, Representatives Dent and Cárdenas formed a 
bipartisan caucus on the topic of student-athlete well-being.142 They hope that 
their bipartisan caucus will inform other members of Congress about the  
myriad issues facing intercollegiate athletics and help to move forward  
proposed legislation.143 
V. CONCLUSION 
American intercollegiate athletics today are in a state of crisis.  Our long 
history and revered traditions of amateurism, academics, and fair play are in 
jeopardy, and the future of intercollegiate athletics and the protection and  
nurturing of its revered history and traditions are uncertain at best.  The ongoing 
                                                          
135. Id. § 2. 
136. Id. § 3. 
137. See Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act, H.R. 3545, 113th Cong. (2013). 
138. Id. § 2. 
139. Id. 
140. Id.  
141. H.R. 2731. 
142. Press Release, Congressman Tony Cárdenas & Congressman Charles W. Dent, Cárdenas, 
Dent Form Bipartisan Student-Athlete Caucus (Aug. 7, 2014), http://cardenas.house.gov/media-cen-
ter/press-releases/c-rdenas-dent-form-bipartisan-student-athlete-caucus. 
143. Id. 
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spate of antitrust and employment law cases being pursued against the NCAA 
is not the best way to balance the complex and conflicting array of social, 
moral, and economic values and objectives at stake. 
We believe that it is time for Congress to get seriously involved in helping 
to guide and chart the future of American intercollegiate athletics.  The ideas 
set forth in the currently proposed Collegiate Student Athletic Protection Act 
and the National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act can serve as a sound 
starting point for meaningful analysis and discussion.  We believe that  
legislation resulting from such a discourse can best serve the economic interests 
of our collegiate educational institutions and the multi-billion dollar  
entertainment industry while also protecting our revered history of amateurism, 
academics, and fair play in intercollegiate athletics, as well as the interests of 
our student-athletes. 
We do not pretend to know how to set up a perfect intercollegiate athletics 
regulatory program that will help sustain the revered traditions and history of 
American intercollegiate athletics.  However, we firmly believe that the  
democratic process is preferable to ongoing judicial decision-making to address 
the growing crisis in intercollegiate athletics.  Our message to Congress is  
simple: It is time to get off the sidelines and play ball!    
